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Davis: The Lesser Included Offense Instruction - Problems with Its Use

COMMENTS
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION-PROBLEMS WITH ITS USE
In the criminal law, certain types of criminal activity
are to be found which admit of degree, the most well known of
these being assault and homicide. First degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter, assault with intent to kill,
assault with a deadly weapon, assault and battery, and simple
assault are some of the sub-types to be found within the
generic crimes homicide and assault. All assault cases have
similar elements which arise from a basic kind of factual
situation. The seriousness of an assault is determined from
nuances within this basic factual situation, the intent of a
defendant usually being the most relevant determination. The
same can be said of all homicide cases. Given a certain type
of factual situation describing assault or homicide, various
degrees of assault or homicide are susceptible of being found
and this finding is made by a jury.
A jury is guided in its determination of degree by instructions, generally authorized by statute,' which are known as
lesser included offense instructions,2 step instructions, or
graduated instructions. They entail instructing a jury to
consider a defendant's guilt as to a lesser offense included
1. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. § 7-268 (1957).
2. An example of such an instruction will be useful at this point. In Ballinger
v. State, 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1968), the court gave the following instruction
to the jury:
You are instructed that under the information filed in this case,
it is your duty upon a consideration of all of the evidence in the case:
1. To consider and determine whether the defendant is guilty or not
guilty of the crime charged: aggravated assault and battery with
a deadly weapon upon the person of Jim Abernatha.
If you should find the Defendant not guilty of the crime of aggravated
assault and battery with a deadly weapon upon the person of Jim
Abernatha, it would then be your duty to further consider and determine:
2. Whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crime of
assault and battery upon the person of Jim Abernatha.
If you should find the Defendant not guilty of the crime of assault
and battery upon the person of Jim Abernatha, it would then be your
duty to further consider and determine:
3. Whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crime of
assault to the person of Jim Abernatha.
If you should find the Defendant not guilty of the crime of aggravated
assault and battery while armed with a deadly weapon against the
person of Jim Abernatha, and not guilty of the crime of assault and
battery against the person of Jim Abernatha, and not guilty of the
crime of assault as to the person of Jim Abernatha, it will be your
duty to find the Defendant not guilty.
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within a charged greater offense. They are used in a substantial nmnber of criminal trials so their use or misuse
has a significant import. The purpose of this comment is to
discuss the use of the lesser included offense instruction,
particularly as such use relates to possible invasion of the

province of the jury.
After a background discussion of the relevant law, this
comment will focus upon two issues. The first involves the
question of when instructions on lesser included offenses
should be given. The second involves restrictions on a jury's
ability to consider lesser included offenses once instructions
have been given.
GENERAL BACKGROUND

The deternination of the degree of a crime is a question
of fact and is exclusively for the jury.' This is not to say
that there are no restrictions on the jury's ability to consider
lesser included offenses. Most courts which have passed on
the issue, including Wyoming,4 have held that this question
of fact is to be submitted to the jury only when a request is
made for an instruction.' In addition, the vast majority of
courts hold that instructions on lesser included offenses are
to be given only when there is evidence to substantiate the
defendant's being guilty only of a lesser offense.' The
requirement for evidence to substantiate a lesser charge is
sometimes phrased in the following terms: Instructions on
lesser included offenses will not be given if the defendant, if
guilty at all, is guilty only of the greater offense.'
3. Gallegos v. People, 316 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1957), in which the court stated:
"The defendant was entitled to have the jury . . determine, under proper
instructions, all questions of fact including the question of the degree of
the offense, . . ." See also State v. Marion, 174 Neb. 698, 119 N.W.2d 164
(1963); People v. Ogg, 159 Cal. App. 2d 38, 323 P.2d 117 (1958); People
v. Munoz, 202 N.Y.S.2d 743 (App. Div. 1960); Strader v. State, 210 Tenn.
669, 362 S.W.2d 224 (1962).
4. Brantley v. State, 9 Wyo. 102, 61 P. 139 (1900).
5. Reynolds v. State, 147 Ind. 3, 46 N.E. 31 (1897); People v. Jordan, 125
App. Div. 522, 109 N.Y.S. 840 (1908) ; State v. Ellis, 105 N.E.2d 65 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1951) ; People v. Walker, 155 Cal. App. 2d 273, 318 P.2d 77 (1957);
State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 P.2d 972 (1960).
6. 5 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2099 (12th ed. 1957); Comment, Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses, 57 Nw. U.L. REY. 62
(1962).
7. State v. Schoeder, 95 Ariz. 255, 389 P.2d 255 (1964), in which the Supreme
Court of Arizona said: "Under our holdings, instructions on lesser offenses
are justified only when there is evidence upon which the jury could convict
In other words, the state of the record must not
of a lesser offense ....
be such that defendant can only be guilty of the crime charged or not
guilty at all." See also State v. Gonzales, 46 Wyo. 52, 23 P.2d 354 (1933).
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In some states, the trial court must instruct on lesser
included offenses regardless of request,' and in at least one
state, the trial court must instruct on lesser included offenses
regardless of whether or not there is any evidence tending
to show the defendant guilty only of a lesser offense.9
Another common rule in this area deserves mention. Most
courts, on request of defense counsel, permit an instruction
telling the jurors that if they are convinced of the defendant's
guilt, but are unsure of the degree, then they may only convict
of the lesser degree." Failure to honor such a request will
result in reversible error."
Although substantial authority supports the proposition
that it is reversible error for lesser included offense instructions to be given when the admitted evidence shows no guilt
of a lesser offense, 2 some courts do not concur." Further,
most courts qualify the above proposition when the defendant is convicted of the greater offense charged, finding no
reversible error on the ground that the defendant is not
prejudiced by the instruction.14 If instructions are not
given on the lesser degrees of a crime and the evidence in a
case supports such instructions, there is reversible error. 5
Courts do not often discuss the purpose and effect of step
instructions, but some comments have been made. Statements
are found which term these instructions a protection for
defendants since the jury may convict of a lesser offense if
8. State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 84 S.E.2d 545 (1954); Tarter v. State, 359
P.2d 596 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961); Strader v. State, 210 Tenn. 669, 362
S.W.2d 224 (1962).
9. State v. Barnes, 182 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1966). California, in some cases,
approaches this standard, see People v. Smith 16 Cal. Rptr. 12 (Cal. App.
Div. 1961).
10. 5 WHARTON, supra note 6.
11. 5 WHARTON, supra note 6. See People v. Dewberry, 7 Cal. Rptr. 548, 334
P.2d 852 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1959); Delaney v. State, 14 Wyo. 1, 81 P. 792
(1905) ; Eagen v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215 (1942).
12. Green v. United States, 218 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1955); People v. Brown,
415 Ill. 23, 112 N.E.2d 122, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 804 (1953); People
v. Jones, 384 Ill. 407, 51 N.E.2d 543 (1943); State v. Reed, 39 N.M. 44, 39
P.2d 1005 (1934); State v. Alston, 228 N.C. 555, 46 S.E.2d 567 (1948).
13. Killen v. State, 92 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1957) ; Robinson v. State, 109 Ga. 506,
34 S.E. 1017 (1900).
14. Lewis v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 72, 109 S.W.2d 25 (1937); Stump v. State,
132 Neb. 49, 271 N.W. 163 (1937); State v. Robinson, 182 Kan. 505, 322
P.2d 767 (1958). See Annot., 102 A.L.R. 1019 (1936), which sets down the
general rule for homicide cases.
15. 5 WHARTON, supra note 6. See Gallegos v. People, 316 P.2d 884 (Colo.
1957) ; People v. Yancy, 171 Cal. App. 2d 371, 340 P.2d 328 (1959); State v.
Ulibarri, 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 275 (1960).
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Other authorities

state that the intsructions are prosecution-oriented and allow
the prosecution to gain a conviction when some element of a
crime is not proven.' Perhaps the most accurate statement
of the effect of a lesser included offense instruction is to be
found in a New York case, People v. Munoz,"8 in which it
was said:
Consequently, although originally "intended merely
to prevent the prosecution from failing where some
element of the crime charged was not made out"...
the doctrine... redounds to the benefit of defendants
as well, since its effect actually is to empower the
jury "to extend mercy to an accused by finding a
lesser degree of crime than is established by the
evidence. 9
There are two obvious situations in which the use or
non-use of lesser included offense instructions may be unfair
to either the defendant or the prosecution. First, when facts
are put in evidence which support instructions as to lesser
degrees and they are not given, the jury may be faced with
the choice either of acquitting a man who is obviously guilty
of some wrong or of finding guilty a man who is not guilty
of the crime charged. For example, when there is evidence
to support second degree murder but only first degree murder
is instructed upon, the jury may have to choose between
setting free a man whom they believe to be guilty of second
degree murder or convicting a man whom they do not believe
guilty of first degree murder. Second, when no evidence
exists to substantive instructions on lesser degrees but they
are given, the jury may compromise its doubt as to a greater
degree by convicting of a lesser degree. From the defendant's
standpoint, the first seems to be the greater evil in most cases.
16. People v. Netzel, 295 Mich. 353, 294 N.W. 708, 711 (1940) (dissenting
opinion), wherein it was stated: "The statute protects the accused by giving
the jury a leeway to convict him of a lesser offense when they are convinced
that a crime has been committed, although they may have some doubt that
the proofs make out the major crime."
17. People v. Miller, 143 App. Div. 251, 253, 128 N.Y.S. 549, 550, aff'd 202 N.Y.
618, 96 N.E. 1125 (1911), in which the court said: "These two sections ...
were both declaratory of the rule which had always obtained at common
law, which was that the prosecution never was allowed to fail because all
the alleged facts were not proved, if such as were proved made out a crime
though of an inferior degree." See also Comment, Jury Instructions on
Lesser Included Offenses, supra note 6.
18. 202 N.Y.S.2d 743 (App. Div. 1960).
19. Id. at 746.
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When there is evidence to substantiate the commission of
a lesser offense, the giving of a lesser included offense instruction serves a dual beneficial purpose. It helps to prevent a
defendant from being convicted of a greater offense than
his guilt warrants and at the same time, enables the prosecution to gain conviction of an offense which corresponds
more closely to the actual guilt of a defendant.
Since the question of degree is a question of fact and is
held to be within the jury's province, an important problem
arises as to when a trial court can prevent a jury's consideration of lesser included offenses. A trial court's affirmative
prevention, by instruction, of a jury's consideration of lesser
offenses, when there is evidence to support those offenses, is
an invasion of the province of the jury,2" and as some courts
have held, is a violation of a defendant's constitutional right
to trial by jury.2 1

When the jury has been prevented from considering lesser offenses, the crucial issue for most courts is whether or
not the evidence in a case shows an instruction on lesser
offenses to be justified. Varying requirements are made for
the quantum of evidence sufficient to support an instruction.
At one end of the spectrum, submission of lesser degrees is
required when there is any evidence, no matter how lacking
in credibility, to substantiate such a charge.22 At the other
end, submission of an instruction on lesser degrees will only
be allowed when there are reasonable grounds for believing
a lesser offense to have been committed.2" This latter position
raises questions as to the invasion of the province of the jury
as a fact-finder.
The jury's province is supposedly that of the exclusive
trier of fact, but it is necessary to determine how far this
principle has been extended. Can the jury decide "facts"
contrary to the weight of evidence? A United States District
Court has noted that juries have the "inherent" power to
find a defendant not guilty regardless of how overwhelming
20. People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 69 N.W.2d 140 (1955); State v. Shea, 226
S.C. 501, 85 S.E.2d 858 (1955).
21. Henwood v. People, 54 Colo. 188, 129 P. 1010 (1913); Strader v. State, 210
Tenn. 669, 362 S.W.2d 224 (1962).
22. Gallegos v. People, 316 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1957); Strader v. State, 210 Tenn.
669, 362 S.W.2d 224 (1962).
23. Zenou v. State, 4 Wis.2d 655, 91 N.W.2d 208 (1958).
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the evidence of guilt might be.24 In a case decided by the
Supreme Court of Florida, submission of a lessor included
offense was approved even though there was no evidence of
the commission of a lesser offense.2 5 The court stated that
this was merely "an affirmance of the power of the jury" to
find a defendant guilty of a lesser offense despite the weakness of evidence as to a lesser degree. The California Supreme
Court has stated that the jury has the power, "because of
obvious extralegal factors or for no apparent reason," to go
against what the evidence seems to show and to find a defendant only guilty of a lesser degree of a crime.2 6
WHEN LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE

INSTRUCTIONS SiouID BE GIVEN

Two Ohio cases present the primary issues deserving
2 7 the jury was
discussion in this area. In State v. Patterson,
only instructed as to second degree murder, but the Ohio
Supreme Court held that there was no error in refusing to
instruct as to first degree manslaughter even though the
facts might have warranted such instruction. The court
reasoned that the refusal to so instruct was tantamount to
a directed verdict of not guilty of the lesser included offense
and was therefore beneficial to the defendant. In State v.
Loudermill, the Ohio Supreme Court overruled this holding
on the basis that it went against the statutory commandment
and that it was "the duty of the court to give, as well as that
of the jury to consider, a charge on the lesser included offenses
which are shown by the evidence to have been committed." 2"
The decision in State v. Patterson clearly marked the
furthest extension of a court's affirmative exclusion of lesser
offenses from the jury's consideration. The Pattersoncourt's
justification is obviously not true in all situations and the
Ohio Supreme Court recognized this in Loudermill. The
Loudermill court expressed concern over the situation in
which a defendant was obviously guilty of a lesser charge, but
was not clearly guilty of the greater crime charged and instruc24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

United States v. Fielding, 148 F. Supp. 45, 56 (1957).
Killen v. State, 92 So.2d 825, 827-28 (Fla. 1957).
People v. Powell, 34 Cal. 2d 196, 208 P.2d 974, 980 (1949).
172 Ohio St. 319, 175 N.E.2d 741 (1961).
2 Ohio St. 2d 79, 206 N.E.2d 198 (1965).
Id. at 199.
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ted upon. It felt that a jury might fabricate the elements of
the charged crime rather than turn a defendant loose upon
society, and pointed out that this possibility is a consequence
to be expected when there has been a failure to instruct on
a lesser included offense and there is evidence of the commission of that offense. If there is an adherence to the maxim
that it is better that ten guilty men go free than that one
innocent man is convicted (and this innocence must extend
to innocence of a particular degree of a crime), then it is
clear that the Loudermill decision is an emminently fair one.
The Louidermill court, however, does not go far enough.
The court felt it was the duty of a jury to consider lesser
charged offenses "which are shown by the evidence to have
been conmitted." Here lies the rub. The trial court, by the
upper court's statement, must determine whether or not the
evidence shows a lesser crime to have been committed before
submitting on lesser degrees, and this is the rule in most
jurisdictions. But the statement seems to authorize discretion on the part of the trial court which could be subject to
abuse. A trial court could as effectively keep from the jury's
consideration questions of fact concerning lesser offenses by
rigidly construing the evidence as it could by deciding that
the jury has no power to determine degree. So we are confronted with a back door invasion of the province of the jury.
Florida has recognized the possible evils inherent in a
trial court's treatment of the evidence in a case, but has
produced a solution to the problem that creates further problems. Florida has determined that the jury must be instructed
as to a lesser included offense even when there is no evidence
to support guilt of a lesser offense. In some cases a defendant's only defense will be an alibi or insanity, and in those
cases, he is either guilty of the greater offense or not guilty
at all. A jury may, however, compromise its doubt as to the
defendant's guilt of a greater offense by convicting of a lesser
crime, a crime of which the defendant cannot logically be

guilty.
A number of courts, also recognizing the possible evils involved in a trial court's treatment of the evidence, require a
trial court to instruct on lesser included offenses when there
is any evidence to support such instruction. This position
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seems to be the best solution to the dilemma. It avoids abuses
by the trial court and still prevents the jury from considering
a lesser offense when there can be no guilt of a lesser offense.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE JURY'S
CONSIDERATION OF LESSER OFFENSES

The situation in which a jury is inhibited from determining the degree of a crime will now be examined. Two cases,
0 and Ballinger v.
State v. Hacker"
State," provide convenient
vehicles for such an examination.
In State v. Hacker, an assault case, the trial court instructed the jury that if it found the defendant not guilty of
assault with intent to kill, then it was to consider his guilt
as to common assault. The Supreme Court of Missouri found
that this instruction was not erroneous, and approved instructions which ordered the jury to first consider and decide the
defendant's guilt as to a greater charged offense before proceeding to consider a lesser charge." The appellant argued
that the instruction took the burden of proof away from the
prosecution. This is clearly incorrect since the jury, when
considering the greater offense, was still subject to instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof. The Court,
however, did little to show why such an instruction might be
proper, merely quoting a section out of Corpus Juris Secundum which generally stated the court's conclusion."
The effect of such an instruction is that it orders the
jury's deliberations by first forcing the jury to acquit of
the greater offense before it can even consider a lesser one.
This puts a great burden on the jury's ability to determine
30. 214 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1948).

31. 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1968).

32. This type of instruction seems to be in fairly common usage. See Mathes &
DEvITT, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 15.10 (1965).
Ohio
courts use this type of instruction, see Reid, BRANSON INSTRUCTIONS TO
JURIES § 3851, at 597 (3rd ed. 1962), as do Oklahoma and Wisconsin courts.
See Thoreson v. State, 69 Okla. 128, 100 P.2d 896 (1940); Dillon v. State,
137 Wis. 655, 119 N.W. 352 (1940). This list is not intended to be exhaustive
but is intended merely to show the widespread use of the Hacker type instruction.
33. 41 CJ.S., Homicide, § 390 n.7, at 206. This section cited Dillon v. State, 137
Wis. 655, 119 N.W. 352 (1909). This case merely stated that an instruction
which ordered the jury's deliberation was proper, giving no reason for
the conclusion. Another case, Thoreson v. State, 69 Okla. 128, 100 P.2d
896 (1940), also mentioned such instructions, but this was pure dictum in
a case in which the form of the instruction was not challenged. Extensive
research has been unable to produce any other cases which mention the
ordering aspect of step instructions.
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the degree of a crime since they cannot consider all the
degrees until they have decided on a greater degree.
As a general rule, a jury is not given instructions on
lesser included offenses unless the evidence makes out neither
a perfect case for the commission of a greater offense nor
makes out a perfect case for the commission of a lesser
offense. This necessarily follows from the fact that most
courts do not allow instructions on lesser offenses unless
there is evidence to show the defendant only guilty of a lesser
offense. Given the above statements, an analogy can be constructed showing a situation similar to that which is produced
by the giving of a Hacker type instruction: A person is
handed a peg and is shown three holes, none of which quite
fit the peg perfectly. He is told that it is his exclusive duty
and province to decide which of the three holes most tightly
accommodates the peg. After he inserts the peg in the first
hole, the individual is asked to decide if this hole most tightly
fits the peg. He is told that he must decide on the first hole
before he can even consider the tightness of the fit in the
other two holes. Of course, the other two holes could be seen
but this would be of little help unless there was an obvious
misfit. Upon such a restriction of deliberation one would
wonder about his "exclusive duty and province," and would
strongly suspect that a strong bias for the first hole was
being demonstrated.
The instruction in Hacker directed the jury to first
determine the defendant's guilt as to the greater charge
before deliberating on the lesser charge. What is a jury to do,
when given a Hacker type instruction, if it cannot agree on
the defendant's guilt or innocence on the greater charge?
This was exactly the problem in Ballinger v. State. 4 The
jurors were given an instruction which told them that if they
were to find the defendant not guilty of aggravated assault
(assault with a deadly weapon), then it was their duty to
consider the lesser offense of assault and battery. After four
and one half hours of deliberation, the jury asked the trial
court this question: "If we are unable to reach a tmanimous
decision on one charge, do we vote on the next lesser charge ?" r
The trial court then told them: "Only if you all agree to
34. 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1968). See instructions given by the court supra note 2.
35. Id. at 309.
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consider a lesser charge." 8 Two hours later the jury found
the defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. The
Supreme Court of Wyoming upheld this supplemental instruction although Justice Gray dissented, stating that he
believed the supplemental instruction to be prejudicial error.
The jury was first told that it could not consider lesser
charges until it acquitted of the greater charge. It was then
told that if it was deadlocked, it could not vote on a lesser
charge unless all the members agreed to consider a lesser
charge. The jury was forced to follow a formal procedure
requiring unanimous agreement to vote on the lesser degree
and could be stopped by any juror who wished to convict of
the greater offense. Justice Gray said of this procedure: "Its
effect was simply to direct the jury either to convict or acquit
the defendant of the primary charge when obviously the
members were in serious disagreement on that charge." 7 The
combined restrictions on the jury's deliberations imposed by
the Ballinger court fly in the face of pronouncements declaring it to be the exclusive province of the jury to determine
degree.
The majority of the court in Ballinger reasoned that
courts have the power to control litigation before them and
to adopt suitable rules for that control. This broad statement
does not meet the issue. A court could not adopt a rule
requiring the jurors to deliberate in separate groups of three.
A court could not adopt a rule disallowing consideration of
the case by seven of the twelve jurors. The court asked itself
what better reply the trial court could have given. The
obvious answer to this query is that the trial court could
have told the jurors that if they were unable to reach an
unanimous decision, they should vote on the next lesser
charge. The trial court should not have imposed its arbitrary
requirement upon the deliberations of the jurors. Justice
Gray, in his dissenting opinion, appropriately quoted State
3 in which the Wyoming Supreme Court admonv. Carroll,
ished against a trial court's attempting in any way to influence a jury toward either a greater or lesser verdict.
86. Id.
37. Id. at 311.
88. 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542, 568 (1937).
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Understandably, many courts fear the license of the jury,
and indirectly attempt to influence and control the jury by
instruction. There is evidence that juries do reach compromise
verdicts when unable to agree on the degree of a crime."
There is also evidence that juries will convict of lesser offenses
because of considerations other than the merits. ° But these
supposed faults of the jury are found in other areas of
litigation. It appears that we are forced to accept these
jury characteristics if we are to have the jury in the form
it is known in the United States.
In America, the jury has a great vitality, assured by the
great discretion allowed jurors in their deliberations and
findings. This discretion and consequent vitality could be
curtailed by placing rigid restrictions on jury procedure.
The trial court could be allowed to enter the jury room and
supervise the deliberations of the jurors. The trial court
could also be allowed to instruct the jury in such a way that
their deliberations would be confined to the consideration of
narrow, specific fact determinations, with a general verdict
thereby being prevented. All these methods have been employed in Europe and have resulted in the emasculation of
juries."
In the United States, the jury is obviously not allowed
complete discretion, but the reach of the European methods
far exceeds any restrictions imposed on the jury in this
country, and, in fact, is alien to our traditional attitudes
toward the jury. Nevertheless, when a trial court is given
wide discretion to determine whether a question of fact as
to degree is present in a factual situation, when a trial court
can, by instruction, carefully order and restrict a jury's
deliberations within the jury room, European methods are
being approached with their assured emasculation of the
jury. If the jury is to be the exclusive trier of fact, as is
claimed in this country, and is to be a bulwark against official
tyranny, as is also claimed, it is absolutely necessary that the
trier of facts not be fettered with arbitrary procedural
restrictions.
39.

KALYEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY 477 n.4

(1966).

40. Id. at Chs. 15-27.
41. Id. at 13 n.3.
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CONCLUSION
In the step instruction type case, such as assault or
homicide, a problem is encountered of no less magnitude
than that of the preservation of the integrity of the American
jury. Rules which allow clear fact questions to be taken
away from the jury and instructions that order and direct
the deliberations of the jury combine to emasculate juries.
If administered properly, the theory behind lesser included
offense instructions is sound and can result in greater fairness to both sides in a criminal dispute. But in order for
the lesser included offense instruction to be a useful tool in
the administration of criminal justice, it is necessary that:
1) Instructions on lesser included offenses be given when
there is any evidence to support the defendant's guilt of a
lesser offense; and (2) Courts refrain a) from giving instructions which first direct a jury to determine the guilt of a
defendant as to a greater offense before considering his guilt
of a lesser offense, and b) from giving instructions which
inhibit a jury from considering a lesser offense when unable
to agree on a greater offense.
JOHN W. DAVIS
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